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Policy pilots are a cornerstone of evidence-based policy and they are frequently used to test 
new policies in health and social care in England. This chapter argues that policy pilots share 
many of the characteristics of other public sector projects and can therefore be understood as 
part of the phenomenon described as ‘projectification’ in public administration. Policy pilots 
are used to reduce the uncertainties associated with new policy, but they also allow central 
government to manage the relationship with local organisations such as local authorities or 
organisations of the NHS. Piloting also appeals to policy makers as pilots promise to promote 
practical and innovative solutions to often complex and contested policy problems, such as 
whole system transformation. Pilots attract criticism of depoliticisation, although in practice 
there is little suggestion that they provide the definite answers that policy-makers desire or 









Policy pilots are an intellectual cornerstone of evidence-based policy (EBP) as they hold out 
the promise, at least ostensibly, that policy will be rigorously tested before being rolled out 
more widely.  Pilots are thus usually accompanied by evaluations designed to establish 
whether the policy change being tried out has the potential to generate the intended effects 
and is worth the investment. In England, national policy pilots have been promoted as an 
important instrument for central government, in particular, to better inform policy 
formulation and to manage the risks arising from new policy. While much attention has been 
given to the role of evaluation in generating the evidence from pilots (Cameron et al., 2011, 
Craig et al., 2008, HM Treasury, 2011), policy pilots have yet to be analysed as a specific 
type of policy project.  
There is now a substantial literature analysing, and critiquing, the role of projects and project 
management in the public sector. Projects have become the dominant mode of organising 
activity in the corporate world and, in countries such as England, are widely used in the 
public sector. By now, some sectors are entirely organised through projects, notably 
international development. The European Union exercises a large swathe of its policy 
influence through project funding, either in regional development or through funding of the 
arts and sciences (see the Chapters by Fred and Mukhtar-Landgren and by Jalocha and 
Ćwikła in this book). Nowadays, scientific research is almost exclusively organised through 
competitively acquired funding in the form of project grants and commissioned research. In 
innovation policy of all kinds, projects are ubiquitous, with policy-making itself also 
becoming increasingly ‘projectified’ (see Hall’s Chapter in this book).  
Policy pilots share many of the characteristics of projects discussed in the project and project 
management literature. Like other public sector projects, pilots promise to accelerate change 
(Jensen et al., 2013), and to combine “controllability and adventure” (Sahlin-Andersson and 
 
Söderholm, 2002), three qualities that are highly desirable in policy-making. They offer the 
prospect of enabling policy makers to control the risks of new policy while also creating a 
space for policy experimentation. They also operate within a set time frame, usually 
compatible with electoral cycles, occupy a particular space as a “temporary organisation” 
(Lundin and Söderholm, 1995) within a permanent (host) organisation, and are normally 
funded through distinct budgets rather than mainstream funding. Thus there are boundaries 
drawn between the pilot as a project and the routine work of the host organisation, aimed at 
focusing energy on achieving project goals by prioritising specific activities aimed at 
facilitating a desired change from usual practice. Policy pilots also seem to share some of the 
problems attributed to projects and projectification, including concerns about short-termism, 
the difficulty of sustaining change beyond the duration of the pilot, and the potential for de-
politicisation (Parsons, 2002).  
This chapter aims to contribute to the literature on projects and projectification by 
considering the role of policy pilots in policy-making as a form of public sector project. Our 
observations are derived from our research on policy piloting and our experience as 
evaluators of policy pilots in health and social (long-term) care in England (Ettelt et al., 
2015a, Ettelt et al., 2015b). The first part examines the conceptual overlap of projects and 
pilots, and identifies the project characteristics of policy piloting, drawing on the literature on 
project and project management. In doing so, we draw attention to the dual structure of pilot 
programmes since they typically comprise one or more implementation projects (i.e. pilots 
implemented in pilot ‘sites’) and a linked research project (i.e. the evaluation of these pilots).  
In the second part of the chapter, we make three observations based on our research on policy 
piloting in health and social care in England that resonate with the literature on projects and 
projectification. These are: (1) the relevance of the centre-periphery relationship as the 
 
governance context in which policy piloting takes place; (2) the importance given to 
evaluation and generating evidence; and (3) the difficulty of sustaining achievements and 
‘scaling up’ efforts after the end of the pilots that explains their limited contribution to policy 
change. We conclude by reflecting on the political implications of policy piloting in health 
and social care in England, arguing that piloting is politically convenient as it shifts the 
responsibility for potential failure to local actors while reflecting positively on the aspirations 
of Central Government.  
 
Policy pilots as projects 
Policy piloting is a type of policy project. Pilots have a deadline, budgets, a project 
management team and a declared goal of promoting policy change. In instrumental terms, 
they are a change management tool that policy-makers can use when, or before, introducing 
policy change more widely. In English policy-making, pilots typically come in clusters, as 
pilot programmes, which then consist of a number of projects that are embedded and layered 
in a pilot programme, and are given a distinctive name such as ‘demonstrators, ‘pioneers’ or 
‘trailblazers’. We here distinguish three layers within a national policy pilot programme: a 
national policy project that is the pilot programme; pilot projects through which the policy is 
implemented (and tested) locally; and a research project that aims to find out whether the 
policy ‘works’ by evaluating the local policy pilots (occasionally, this includes evaluating the 
effectiveness of national level management of the programme). In this model, drawing on 
Jensen and colleagues (in this book), policy piloting often combines characteristics of the 
“change project”, intended to change existing organisational practices, with those of the 
“experimental project”, aimed at testing new activities to be added to an existing practice.   
 
In England, central Government initiates and funds policy pilots with the stated aim to test 
policy before it is rolled out more widely.1 Such programmes typically consist of several 
local pilots, but the number of sites per programme varies widely. These are implemented, for 
example, by local authorities, local organisations within the National Health Service (NHS), 
or other organisations in the public, private or voluntary sector, often in combination (e.g. 
local authorities working with NHS Clinical Commissioning Groups and care homes that are 
owned by private businesses or voluntary organisations). National policy-makers, in this case 
usually officials at the Department of Health and Social Care or one of its arm’s length 
agencies such as Public Health England or NHS England, also commission an evaluation, 
typically involving a research team, often, but not exclusively, based in academia.  
Lundin and Söderholm (1995) distinguishe ‘task’, ‘time’, ‘teams’ and ‘transition’ as central 
dimensions of projects and we will use these attributes to further disentangle the organisation 
of health and social care policy pilots. The task of pilot sites it to implement the policy that is 
being piloted, meaning that their task is to operationalise policy and put ideas set out in 
policy papers into organisational practice. In this sense, implementation in pilot sites can be 
seen as a “single project as unit of analysis” that is “understood as a manageable and 
researchable item whose intrinsic mechanisms were to be uncovered in pursuit of project 
success” (Packendorff, 1995, Packendorff and Lindgren, 2014). Project success, however, is 
typically not clearly specified ex ante and pilot sites can vary hugely in how they interpret 
national policy aims and what they aim to achieve. Instead, it is often the task of the 
evaluators to define clearly the outcomes sought and the related indicators that help specify 
and measure these outcomes, and it is their responsibility then to establish whether these 
outcomes can be attributed to the policy that is being piloted.  
                                                          
1 We refer to England instead of the United Kingdom (UK), as responsibility for health and social care policy is 
devolved to the four countries that form the UK. 
 
The task of implementing policy in pilot sites is usually presented as orderly and straight-
forward, but inevitably turns out to be as messy and complex as implementation in any other 
policy ‘swamp’ (Argyris and Schön, 1978). Pilot implementation includes a large number of 
decisions, trial and error, and eliminating alternatives. It also involves ‘unlearning’ previous 
ways of working and typically relies on actors within the host organisation and its wider 
network of public and private sector organisations to come together and agree on a course of 
action, especially in those pilots that aim for ‘integration’ between sectors. Policy 
implementation is complicated by the fact that it is sometimes not clear what is to be 
implemented. A broad policy idea may appear plausible in a Green Paper in which a 
government consults on its plans for future policy, but remains aspirational if there is no clear 
idea of how it can be operationalised in practice.  
The research project is also broken down into a number of sub-projects, usually an outcome 
evaluation, process evaluation and an economic evaluation, to establish whether the policy 
can produce certain outcomes, how these are produced, and whether it constitutes value for 
money. The task therefore is to complete the evaluation and produce findings within given 
timeframes and budgets. Compared to the task of implementing the pilots, the research 
project is significantly more structured ex ante with a predefined sequence of tasks (e.g. 
research ethics and governance approvals, development of tools, data collection, data 
analysis, etc.) set out in a proposal or protocol. There is space for adjustments, but this 
depends on the research design with some designs being more flexible than others (e.g. 
randomised controlled trials rely on a stricter protocol and a more narrow definition of the 
nature of the policy as an ‘intervention’ than, say, case study research).   
It is interesting to consider what constitutes the ‘task’ from the perspective of national policy-
makers who initiate pilots and commission their evaluations. Their task usually includes 
 
clarifying policy objectives, selecting pilot sites and developing implementation guidelines. 
However, as our research has shown, objectives of pilots are rarely stable and are likely to 
change over time, especially in an environment in which policy-makers change frequently, 
with Ministers being replaced and civil servants reorganised or made redundant to reduce the 
Government’s administrative headcount (Ettelt et al., 2015a). After the end of a pilot 
programme, the tenets of evidence-based policy assert that policy-makers ‘make use’ of the 
findings from the evaluations and deliberate on their implications for the roll-out of the 
policy. In some cases, evaluation findings are instrumental in informing policy decisions. 
Yet, in other cases, priorities for policies have shifted during the life of the programme. If 
findings are less favourable than expected, policy-makers may be inclined to drop the policy, 
postpone its wider implementation, or try to find solutions to overcome problems identified 
by the research. Alternatively, they could ‘cherry pick’ findings to make them sound more 
positive in pursuit of wider policy goals (e.g. in the case of the evaluation of the Whole 
Systems Demonstrators2, which were testing the use of assistive technologies for people with 
long-term conditions, the government highlighted the positive findings in order to justify 
further technological investment) (Ettelt et al., 2015b).  
Time is of obvious relevance to policy pilots, which are time-limited by definition.  Since it is 
the declared purpose of policy pilots to inform policy decisions, the programme needs to be 
organised in a way to allow for the evaluation to report when the findings are needed. Thus, 
pilot programmes often depend on political schedules (e.g. legislative cycles) to determine 
their endpoint. The problem is that this can leave too little time to implement the pilots, let 
                                                          
2 The ‘Whole System Demonstrators’ were a government-funded pilot programme conducted between 2008 
and 2011 that tested the use of assistive technologies such as pendent alarms for older people at risk of falling 
(referred to as telecare) or diabetes management devices  (referred to as telehealth) used in people’s homes. 
The name of the programme was aspirational, indicating the intention to use these technologies to help 
integrate services at the boundary between the health and social care systems. While the evaluation of the 
individual technologies showed moderate positive effects, the programme did not achieve its overarching aim 
of integrating systems of care.  
 
alone to evaluate them, especially if the pilots need to produce a sufficient number of 
observable outcomes. There is an increasing recognition by policy-makers that more time 
needs to be allocated to allow pilot programmes to be set up. However, it is often hard to 
predict how much time is sufficient for pilot sites to operationalise the policy and when a 
programme is mature enough for its evaluation to capture the policy’s true potential (Ogilvie 
et al., 2011). It is sometimes claimed that policy pilots would have produced better outcomes 
if they had been allowed more time and that this explains why very similar pilot programmes 
are frequently mounted in swift succession (Bardsley et al., 2013).  Yet while it seems 
obvious that programmes should be allowed to ‘bed in’, this is often not realistic within the 
time constraints that come with national policy-making.  Lurking behind this empirical 
problem is an unresolved question as to how much time is enough to be able to judge whether 
a programme has generated sufficient evidence to determine whether the policy is worth 
persisting with or should be discontinued.  
The pilot projects and their research projects are typically executed by separate teams. Staff 
implementing the pilots may be recruited from the permanent workforce of the organisation 
or employed on temporary contracts, with pilot managers often having other responsibilities 
within the host organisation.  The project literature emphasises that the project team 
simultaneously anchors the project in the structure of the host organisation and separates it 
from its routine operations (Lundin and Söderholm, 1995, Jensen et al., 2013, Godenhjelm et 
al., 2015). This resonates with pilot projects that typically rely on project managers to 
collaborate extensively with other members of the organisation and with other organisations, 
while at the same time keeping the team focused on implementing change. In addition, many 
contemporary pilot programmes in England aim to improve the collaboration between 
different organisations (e.g. to promote ‘integration’ of health and social care). In such 
programmes, pilot teams can sit between existing organisations, making it more difficult to 
 
maintain links with the existing structures and secure their support. Typically, such pilots do 
not sit within a legal entity, nor do their form their own one, which means they are not 
allowed to hold their own budget, which arguably exposes them even more to tensions 
between, or simply lack of interest from their participant organisations.  
The research project is also organised around a team, typically brought together for the 
purpose of the evaluation and based on individual competencies. Temporary contracts are the 
norm for the majority of research staff with the exception of senior researchers who tend to 
work on other projects alongside contributing to a particular evaluation. There are different 
schools of thought with regard to the separation of implementers and evaluators (more about 
this below), yet evaluators are typically expected to be independent from policy-makers, for 
example, by limiting the ability of policy-makers to influence, or prevent, the publication of 
findings, although this varies across different policy fields with health being the most wedded 
to independent evaluation.   
The stated purpose of national piloting policy is to promote policy change and thus facilitate 
transition. While this is in line with other types of public sector projects (Jensen et al., 2013), 
policy piloting, at least in theory, aspires to a different route to transition: policy change 
based on evidence produced from evaluation. The assumption is that findings from evaluation 
will be used by policy-makers to inform future policy decisions, so that these decisions are 
taken on a more informed basis, which then leads to decreased opposition and increased 
support for the policy change. However, this instrumental logic is problematic. Findings 
appear to be most palatable when they confirm a decision, rather than challenge it. They are 
also not always conclusive enough to support a specific decision. Frequently, more research 
is needed, for example, because the pilot sites have taken longer than expected to implement 
the intervention and more time is needed to measure patient/client outcomes in comparison 
 
with some sort of ‘control’ group. In most cases, it is difficult to generalise beyond the remit 
of the programme and questions arise about the transferability of findings to other 
prospective areas.  
More familiar from a project perspective is the idea that pilots are used to ‘pump prime’ 
change nationally by initiating projects locally from which other places can then learn. This 
intention is reflected in programmes in which pilot sites are selected based on their 
experience with, and success in, implementing existing policy. However, this approach 
generates  concerns about a potential lack of sustainability of local change and the difficulty 
of ‘rolling out’ the programme to less ‘expert’ sites, especially if pilot sites have been 
selected primarily to be able to ‘show off’ their achievements (Ettelt et al., 2015a). There can 
also be substantial confusion about the mechanism of change that policy pilots are expected 
to promote, which in turn can have an impact on the options and opportunities for evaluation. 
For example, if pilot sites are selected because of their experience, it will be difficult to 
organise a trial that measures the likely costs and benefits when sites start implementing 
‘from scratch ’ (Hendy et al., 2012).  
To summarise, policy pilots share many of the characteristics of other types of public sector 
projects, but there are also some qualifications. The task of implementing policy pilots is 
often less clear in operational terms than it appears in policy documents. Pilots also sit within 
a political environment that both enables and compromises the tasks of implementation and 
evaluation. As pilots are a temporary organisation, there is usually a firm deadline to work 
towards, but deadlines are typically politically determined, not based on a realistic estimate of 
the time it is likely to take to implement the policy change and have it ‘bed down’ sufficiently 
to allow for meaningful evaluation of its long-term consequences. The different teams 
involved emphasise the separation of implementation, evaluation and policy-making, and also 
 
highlight that policy piloting is a multiple team effort that requires substantial coordination. 
Finally, while facilitating change is the obvious purpose of policy piloting, there can be 
confusion as to how transition is to be brought about and the role of evaluation in facilitating 
policy change.  
 
Three observations from policy piloting in health and social care in England 
In the next section, we make three observations based on the findings from our research on 
nationally initiated policy pilots in health and social care in England that resonate with 
debates in the projectification literature. These are 1. the observation that national policy 
piloting is embedded in, and relies on, the specific centre-periphery relationships prevalent in 
health and social care governance in England; 2. the importance of generating evidence from 
evaluation in policy piloting as its proclaimed mechanism of change; and 3. the difficulty of 
sustaining achievements in policy implementation and rolling them out following the end of a 
pilot programme.  
 
1 – Piloting cuts across the centre-periphery relationship  
National policy piloting relies on local actors to implement national policy and therefore 
spans the centre and periphery involved in policy-making. In England, central Government 
initiates national policy pilots by inviting local actors to participate in a pilot programme, 
sometimes, but not always, associated with the promise of additional funding. Local statutory 
actors who volunteer to participate in the programme then implement the pilots in their 
locality, often in collaboration with other organisations in the voluntary or private sector (e.g. 
care homes) or across policy sectors (e.g. NHS organisations working with elected local 
 
authorities). In addition, there are all sorts of local and regional initiatives that may be pilot 
programmes, but are not usually piloting national policy (Bailey et al., 2017). The centre also 
commissions any national evaluation. At times, this is complemented by a requirement to 
invest in additional local evaluation. Central Government also tends to support networking 
activities between pilot sites to foster the exchange of local experience, knowledge and 
inspiration.  These activities are typically run separately from the evaluation process. Before 
the financial crisis of 2007-08, there would often be a substantial support infrastructure at the 
centre for some pilot programmes, but this has been massively reduced in recent years, in 
part, in response to financial pressures, but also reflecting a new vision for a more restrained, 
scaled-down role for central Government in policy innovation.  
Policy piloting – as practised in health and social care policy in England - reflects an 
understanding of an existing mode of governance and its established centre-periphery 
relationships. The received wisdom is that central Government is responsible for policy 
formulation but has limited ability to engage in, or even control implementation. There are 
many ways in which central influence filters through the system, but responsibility for 
implementation is largely delegated to local actors (Flinders, 2002, Exworthy and Frosini, 
2008, Pratchett, 2004). Local actors, in turn, including local government, do not participate in 
national policy formulation. They may be consulted or ‘listened to’ and their staff may or 
may not support implementation in their role as ‘street-level bureaucrats’ (Lipsky, 1980), but 
they do not have a formal role in decision-making (Ling, 2002).  There are of course 
differences between the two policy sectors: Central Government is more or less directly 
responsible for the NHS and overseen by its administrative agency, NHS England. Social 
care, in contrast, is organised entirely by elected local government. Local government, 
however, is dependent on a centrally allocated social care grant and operates within a 
centrally set policy and regulatory framework.  Yet local authorities have a larger degree of 
 
separation from the centre than, say, organisations of the NHS. They raise some of their own 
funds locally from business rates and household taxes and thus do not depend entirely on 
national resource allocation. Their leaders are primarily accountable to local voters rather 
than central Government, even though local councillors also have to account for their use of 
central government funds. Despite this, the centre acts as the initiator of policy piloting, while 
leaving ‘implementation’ to local actors. In recent years, there has been renewed interest in 
the idea of ‘localism’ and the devolution of responsibilities from the centre to the periphery 
(mostly to the large metropolitan centres through a series of ‘devolution deals’) (Lowndes 
and Pratchett, 2012, Cox, 2010), but on the whole Central Government in England still 
conceives of itself as the main driver of policy innovation. 
In practice, policy ideas launched by the centre are often broad and still require a substantial 
amount of thought, work and effort to operationalise. The pilot is thus a mechanism to 
delegate the task of operationalisation to local actors who deal with the hard graft of working 
through the problems that implementation throws up. For example, as a policy idea, the 
integration of health and social care seems to make eminent sense as it promises both a better 
service for patients and a possibility of reducing costs in the face of increasing demands from 
an ageing population. Yet integration has so far been largely elusive (although it has been 
tried in multiple ways and many places) and consequently central Government has initiated a 
series of locally implemented pilot programmes to test different approaches, establish the 
evidence and diffuse the knowledge of how better integration can be achieved. System 
integration remains out of reach, but the effort is ongoing and the idea of integration, despite 
its many setbacks, is still very much alive. An alternative policy approach would have been to 
bring the health and social care systems under one legislative umbrella, develop a unified 
funding approach and systematically organise a (more) integrated approach to system 
governance and service delivery. Yet this would require national politicians and their policy 
 
advisers to resolve a series of awkward policy dilemmas made more difficult by tightly 
constrained public finances.  So far, this approach has been seen as ‘too difficult’ to be 
contemplated. In contrast, initiating a series of local pilots allows for an incremental approach 
to promoting change by devolving the responsibility for progress to local actors.  
It also shifts the risk of policy failure from the centre to the periphery, while leaving the 
existing governance infrastructure intact. From a central Government perspective, there are at 
least three types of risk related to policy ‘failure’. First, there is the practical risk of a policy 
failing either because its implications were insufficiently thought through, or because other 
stakeholders, on whom implementation relies, withhold their support. The project 
management literature emphasises the risks of time overrun and budget overspend of 
projects, especially in the public sector (Jensen et al., 2013). By initiating a pilot programme, 
Government is able to control these risks as the programme is given a fixed budget and 
timeline within which pilot implementers have to operate. There have been occasions in 
which the length of a programme has been extended, typically to give the evaluation more 
time to measure outcomes, but these extensions have been limited in scope. Perhaps more 
importantly, if the Government decides after the end of a programme that it no longer wishes 
to roll out the policy it is able to abandon it (although there is still the risk of some 
reputational damage).  
Second, there is the reputational risk for Government of being seen as complacent. By 
initiating a pilot programme, and commissioning its evaluation, the Government gives the 
policy some prominence, devotes (limited) resources to it, and makes a commitment to 
engage with the knowledge produced from the process. Initiating pilots signals that the 
Government intends to address a problem and that it is willing to embark on a new approach. 
In this respect, national policy piloting is no different from other public projects that cater for 
 
a demand for change by signalling innovation and entrepreneurship (Sahlin-Andersson and 
Söderholm, 2002) and a “crystallisation of intent” (Pellegrinelli, 2011: 236). However, 
Government often seems most comfortable about its pilot programmes at the stage when they 
are announced, suggesting that there is symbolic value in initiating pilots and commissioning 
their evaluation, as opposed to having to deal with their results (Ettelt et al., 2015a).  
The third risk that central Government will aim to avoid is the risk of opposition to the policy 
growing, and of losing control over the policy discourse. Opposition to a policy is more likely 
to be manageable when the policy is contained within a pilot programme, which is ostensibly 
only meant to ‘test’ the policy on a limited scale.  This gives less room for critics to oppose 
the policy. The management of this third type of risk through piloting contributes to concerns 
about the depoliticisation of policy-making. By focusing attention on local implementation 
and testing, piloting creates a distance between the politics of policy-making and the 
Government that is testing its implementation. In a similar fashion, it is much more likely that 
policy pilots are evaluated locally, than evaluation being applied to projects that Government 
embarks on within its own ranks (e.g. projects undertaken by the Cabinet Office). It also 
focuses on questions of policy effectiveness and cost-effectiveness, while other issues, such 
as distributional fairness (e.g. in respect to finding alternative ways of collecting and 
distributing funding for social care, which has been discussed as a matter of urgency for 
many years) can easily be side-lined. Thus while piloting is a mechanism for testing policy, it 
is also a tool to contain criticism and control the discourse, by which the centre maintains its 
power over policy-making, while simultaneously delegating the practical problem solving to 
local actors.  
 
2 – The importance given to evaluation and the production of evidence 
 
Many projects involve monitoring and evaluation, but in policy piloting generating evidence 
from evaluation is usually a key purpose of the exercise at least ostensibly and at the outset, 
which sets it apart from other types of policy projects (Cabinet Office, 2003, Sanderson, 
2002). The idea is that by evaluating a pilot programme, insights can be gained that can 
inform national policy-making and create the ‘evidence’ in support of a policy. The hope is 
that the evidence generated from the pilots is sufficiently conclusive to support a decision and 
the typical assumption is that it will demonstrate that the new policy ‘works’, i.e. it will 
produce the effects desired.  
However, in practice, the evaluation process often does not work like this. Frequently, the 
findings from the evaluation are equivocal. Evaluators often find it difficult to measure 
outcomes to an extent that they are conclusive, with some recent pilot programmes simply 
unable to attract the number of study participants required to measure outcomes validly in the 
time available. In such cases, evaluation is likely to produce a good understanding of the 
difficulties of implementing the pilots, but it is much harder to establish whether the 
mechanism underpinning the policy can generate the desired outcomes and how these 
outcomes may differ in a wide range of different contexts.  
However, from an implementation perspective, there is also the question as to whether the 
evaluation is targeted at the right audience. Should the evaluation be aimed at informing 
mainly local policy implementers rather than central Government decision-makers? There are 
a number of approaches to evaluation that do exactly this, such as action-research that aims to 
involve implementers strongly in the research to foster learning while the pilots are being 
developed; but these are rarely requested when evaluations of national policy pilots in health 
and social care are commissioned. This also raises the question as to whether findings from 
evaluation should be made available more quickly (as in ‘real-time’ evaluation), rather than at 
 
the end of the programme as is customary and more feasible for rigorous outcome evaluation.  
In practice, evaluators are often encouraged to report early and often, yet it is entirely 
possible that early findings differ from, even contradict, later conclusions that take account of 
all the data collected during a programme.  Though each of these propositions sounds 
desirable, they tend to conflict with the idea of outcome evaluation that is both scientifically 
robust and independent, since this requires that the influence of implementers (and policy-
makers) is kept to a minimum.   
There can also be tension between the purpose of the pilots and the purpose of the evaluation, 
suggesting conflicting ideas about the mechanisms through which policy change influences 
changes in local practice. Should pilots be organised to enable evaluation to be as robust as 
possible? If so, local variation between interventions should presumably be kept to a 
minimum. Or should the pilots be more flexible and allow more variation to encourage local 
innovation, in which case the chances of robust outcome evaluation would be reduced 
dramatically? Having substantial variation between different pilots within a programme 
means that effects of the policy cannot be pooled across pilot sites (as they all implement 
something different), hence limiting the ‘evaluability’ of the programme (Ogilvie et al., 
2011). Presumably, such decisions, if taken consciously, hinge on different ideas about the 
mechanisms of policy change. From an evidence-based policy perspective, it is assumed that 
policy change should be determined by the best available evidence; robust evaluation is 
therefore vital. Yet policy piloting also allows for a more bottom-up type of policy change 
that invites local actors to experiment less formally and develop their own solutions to policy 
problems. This mechanism of policy change tends to be favoured by local organisations, 
perhaps especially local authorities; yet it can conflict with ideas of evidence use in policy 
that favour robust evaluation and a more prescriptive approach to policy piloting.  
 
 
3 – The difficulty of sustaining achievements and spreading them (‘scaling up’) 
To allow project managers in pilot sites to develop new ways of working, the temporary 
organisation that is the pilot requires a degree of separation from the permanent (host) 
organisation.  At the same time, project managers typically rely on the host organisation, its 
resources, structures and networks, for support and to achieve the effects they are expected to 
produce.  
Yet by separating the pilots from their host organisations, the pilots face the same challenge 
that many other projects face: how can the achievements of the pilot be ‘mainstreamed’ into 
the normal ways of working of the host organisation? For example, if the pilots set out to test 
the impacts of providing frail individuals with telecare devices to improve their care at home 
(as attempted in the Whole System Demonstrators), how are local authorities expected to 
continue offering these devices and provide the new service alongside existing services after 
the funding for the pilots has expired? This problem is not trivial, as few policy pilot 
programmes appear to have been sustained beyond the end of the programme (though this 
may be an artefact of the fact that this phenomenon is difficult to research). Those 
interventions that have continued after the formal end of a pilot programme have often been 
scaled down. Given current funding constraints, at least in England, it is difficult to imagine 
how this could be different, unless the intervention piloted clearly shows it can save money. 
Arguably, this is neither unexpected, nor necessarily undesirable.  It is not unexpected, given 
that much research has demonstrated that it takes a long time to embed almost any type of 
change into routine practice; and it may not be undesirable, if we concede that piloting should 
be undertaken without fixed expectations as to its results, similar to the concept of equipoise 
that justifies randomised clinical trials (Petticrew et al., 2013).   
 
There is an added challenge for policy piloting, arising from the aspiration associated with 
evidence-based policy. How can the achievements of the pilots be ‘scaled’ and rolled out 
nationally?  If the intention is that after a successful experience (however defined), the policy 
is to be implemented in other areas beyond those that participated in the pilot programme, 
how can the learning from the pilots inform these efforts? Evidence-based policy stipulates 
that the evaluation will generate the generalisable knowledge that will help others to follow 
suit. However, evaluation, especially of the national, outcome-focused variety, is often not 
well placed to provide the level of detailed, contextual knowledge that implementers are 
likely to require if they are to extend the innovation to other places. In addition, those studies 
with strongest claims to internal validity (e.g. research designs that test causality such as 
randomised controlled trials) tend to have particularly limited external validity, i.e. they 
cannot easily be generalised or their findings applied to other places, and researchers may 
hesitate to provide the kind of prescriptive steer desired by project managers and policy 
makers.  
One aspect of this problem is the relationship between the pilot, and the host organisation and 
its wider network. In the language of piloting and evaluation, this is how the ‘intervention’ 
relates to the ‘context’ or, more precisely, how the variables associated with the context 
influence the intervention/policy and thus the outcomes observed. One way of examining this 
relationship is to require pilot sites to standardise the intervention as much as possible. 
However, this requires prior definition of the intervention and agreement among the parties 
that this definition is the correct one to pilot, which is not always the case, particularly not 
with genuinely innovative pilots. Standardising the implementation may help the robust 
measurement of outcomes, taking account of contextual variables, but it does so by 
precluding the option of exploring alternative approaches to operationalising the policy and 
 
by reducing the options for adaptation that may make the experience of participating in the 
programme more meaningful to local sites. .  
This problem is amplified where pilots set out to make a significant change to existing 
practices and systems.  There can be a significant contrast between the scale of the ambition 
and the ability of pilot programmes to achieve it, almost irrespective of how the evaluation is 
conducted. Programmes such as the Whole System Demonstrators ostensibly set out to show 
how the ‘whole’ local health care and social care systems could become involved in the 
integration of services by introducing patient-operated supportive technologies (telehealth 
and telecare). This did not materialise during the pilot programme because too few people 
could be identified who had both a health care and a social care need that could be 
appropriately met via a technical intervention, so there was little opportunity to integrate care 
in this way. With hindsight, it seems curious that policy makers should believe that telecare 
and telehealth could be expected to transform entire local health and care systems or at least 
to make a noticeable difference to any of them.  If this was ambitious, this was matched by 
the high expectations placed on the evaluation in that it was meant to provide definitive proof 
of the superiority of such technology compared with usual care. Not surprisingly, this did not 
materialise either.  
 
Final reflection: policy piloting in the shadow of ‘politics’ 
In this chapter, we have argued that policy pilots have much in common with other types of 
public sector projects, but that there are also some differences insofar as policy piloting in our 
experience tends to put special emphasis on national evaluation and a proclaimed 
commitment to test whether pilots produce desired outcomes. By drawing on our research on 
policy piloting in health and social care in England, we have shown that national policy 
 
piloting is ostensibly embedded in a particular version of public sector governance, in which 
central Government formulates policy and initiates national programmes while local actors 
solve problems of implementation. Policy piloting is therefore directly exposed to the 
‘politics’ of central Government policy making, its contestation, vagaries and uncertainties, 
and its desire to control the risks associated with policy change, which can be practical 
(avoiding policy failure) as well as reputational (by delegating risk) and political (by defusing 
opposition).  
We have also highlighted the role of evaluation in policy piloting and its importance as a 
mechanism of policy change, which is in line with the central tenets of evidence-based 
policy. However, this approach means that the stakes for evaluation are high in policy 
piloting and much depends on the ‘evaluability’ of the pilots as they are implemented locally 
(Ogilvie et al., 2011, Ettelt and Mays, 2015). Hence, policy-makers are faced with a dilemma: 
should pilots be organised to allow for robust evaluation and therefore risk stifling flexibility 
and local innovation; or should they be organised to encourage local variation, yet at the price 
of reducing the possibility of evaluation to assess whether the policy ‘works’ in a more 
generalizable sense? A further, related observation focuses on the difficulty facing policy 
pilots in maintaining their achievements and transferring their experience to other localities 
that have not participated in the programme, but are expected to learn from the pilots, 
especially through their evaluation. The long-term effects of policy pilots in health and social 
care on local change have yet to be investigated in any depth. There is much less research on 
long-term developments in local governments than on the short-term implementation of 
evidence-based practice (May et al., 2007).  
Examining policy piloting through the lens of the project and projectification literature leads 
us to the question as to why policy-makers embark on pilot programmes. Based on the 
 
analysis presented above, we conclude that piloting allows policy-makers to influence the 
policy process in at least three ways: first, policy piloting shifts the attention from the 
question of the desirability of a new policy to the practical problems of implementation. The 
pilot evaluation will tend to focus on ‘how’ the policy is interpreted and translated into 
practical change rather than ‘why’ it is being suggested in the first place. Second, it allows 
policy-makers to delegate the responsibility for success and failure of pilots and policy to 
local actors, and away from the centre. This is particularly tempting when the risk of failure is 
high, since it is difficult, both conceptually and practically, to distinguish whether ‘failure’ (in 
itself a socially constructed phenomenon) was the result of a conceptually flawed policy or 
because local actors did not implement it correctly (policy failure versus implementation 
failure). Third, piloting helps to mobilise claims to objectivity derived from independent, 
outcome-focused evaluation, which strengthens the authority of policy-makers by lending 
scientific authority to policy decisions (Bijker et al., 2009, Weingart, 1999).  In conjunction, 
these strategies can partly, and perhaps only temporarily, depoliticise the policy process, an 
observation made by critical commentators on the claims of evidence-based policy-making, 
as well as on projectification in the public sector more widely (Parsons, 2002, Cicmil and 
Hodgson, 2006).  
This is striking, given the obvious mismatch between the scale of the ambition loaded on 
programmes aimed at whole system change, system transformation or integration between 
public policy sectors and the deliberately limited investment of political capital and resource 
associated with most pilots. Whether this suggests the survival of pragmatism in English 
policy-making (the optimist’s view) or an attempt to obfuscate politics by devising a smoke-
screen behind which to hide a lack of willingness to address complex social problems (the 
cynics’ view) remains a matter of debate (including between the authors of this chapter). 
However, the ambiguity associated with these two readings may explain why policy piloting, 
 
although initially a New Labour initiative, has remained popular with successive 
(Conservative) governments, including those devoted to the ‘small state’ and austerity 
governance. Projectification helps policy-makers to manage a whole set of complex 
relationships, uncertainties, and expectations that they would otherwise have to deal with 
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